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Abstract: The increasing number of accidents and the growing complexity of system technologies 
lead to the consequence that theoretical models not considering human factor aren't able to fully 
explain real events .. Understanding and evaluating the influence of human factor is necessary to assess 
its weight on the overall system performance .. 
The present work is based on the cognitive model used by CREAM technique - Cognitive Reliability 
and Error Analysis Method .. CREAM offers a cognitive model and its application methodology in a 
practical approach to performance analysis and prediction of human reliability. 
The main goal of this study is the proposal of a modeling technique based on a user-friendly graphic 
representation introducing human reliability main elements and their interactions .. In a second time, 
such a model has been easily implemented by means of a special purpose simulation software called 
SPAR (™ of Clockwork Group ), conceived and used in reliability, availability and logistic support 
assessment A first application was performed developing simulation runs, based on simple 
assumptions about human performance and analyzing the results .. 
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1. THE ROLE OF HUMAN FACTOR IN SYSTEM RELIABILITY ASSESSMENT 
During the last years many incidental events have happened in industrial systems .. They often imply 
many damages for plants, environment and people as well an important performance and safety 
reduction.. An efficient reliability assessment has the aim of avoiding or at least reducing, the possible 
damages consequent to a failure, analysing the overall system plant. In fact the overall reliability of a 
complex system can be assessed by means of a complete analysis of all the aspects characterizing and 
influencing its the global state. Hence it's clear that human factor analysis assumes a fundamental role: 
it can increase safety because it helps to evaluate and reduce human errors .. 
At the very beginning of these studies, human enor assessment was performed using methods derived 
from PSA - Probabilistic Safety Assessment These techniques identify and calculate accidents 
probabilities and frequencies putting the attention only on mechanical components. Human beings are 
modelled as mechanical components or not considered at all 
Only HRA- Human Reliability Analysis [lJ [21 , during the fifties, put the attention on the human factor 
considering performance variability, man-machine interaction and operator control over the system. 
Up to now many methodologies have been developed to help evaluating human reliability following 
the way undertaken by the HRA. At the beginning HRA took into consideration PSA principles, 
giving rise to the 1'1 generation methodologies.. These assign to human errors a probabilistic 
distribution to use in quantitative techniques such as Fault Tree Analysis and so on.. Quantitative 
methodologies represent man as a mechanical component since they are not able to consider dynamic 
interactions with environment, social context and physical aspects .. Moreover in such models there 
isn't a global approach, considering mutual interactions among man, technology and organization 
(MTO - Man, Technology & Organization) and therefore they aren't able to provide a wide-ranging 
representation of a dynamic real systems .. 
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The evoluti on of the first kind of models are the 2"d generation methodologies that, briefly, consist of 
a qualitative assessment and a way of modeling the system which is more coherent with the real state 
of the system and more bound to the operator behaviour .. These models are the cognitive ones, capable 
of considering the interactions of man, social, physical and environmental elements with the 
mechanical system, with a greater qualitative nature .. Since they consider the human element not as a 
mechanical and static component but as a dynamic entity, it's necessary a cognitive model to 
substitute quantitative techniques used by pt generation methodologies .. A cognitive model is defined 
as a modeling techniques able to analyze and represent human knowledge within a working system In 
other words a cognitive model is parametric representation of human behaviour .. A consistent model of 
human cognition is one of the most important and critical to be represented .. A cognitive model is used 
to define the way in which actions are typically produced by human minds and can help in realizing 
the way how erroneous actions may come out In the last years many cognitive models have been 
proposed to the scientific community, trying to represent in a better way all the possible dynamics of 
human behavior. The cognitive model used for the present study derives from SMoC (Simple Model 
of Cognition).. It uses four basic cognitive functions which are Observation, Interpretation, Planning 
and Execution in order to represent the process followed to fulfill any task In SMoC cognition has a 
cyclic nature: hierarchical classifications does not exist, cognition is a process in continuous evolving 
Moreover, starting from a cognitive model, it is possible to assess which is the cognitive demand for a 
specific procedure and which is the corresponding cognitive available pro file of the operator. 
2. THEMODEL 
The main goal of this study is the proposal of a modelling technique able to represent human factor 
elements inside the reliability assessment of a control system. For a mixed man-machine system, 
quantifying reliability performances is very difficult because, at the present moment, there isn't any 
model representing numerically human influence. 
Let us consider a system composed by some process components and a control device monitoring that 
process.. The reliability of the electromechanical system is appraisable using the well known 
techniques, such as RBDs, etc .. Regarding the other part of the system, the introduction of operators 
with control tasks, would involve consequences in terms of reliability variation which we'd like to 
evaluate. The links between operators and the plant's physical components are the operative 
procedures. Their analysis and study was chosen as the way to model and structure the man-system 
interaction process .. The procedures are represented within the model thanks to the CTA (Cognitive 
Task Analysis) [3l which splits every step in simple tasks. For each of them it identifies the 
fundamental cognitive functions .. In our reliability representation model every procedure is converted 
into the fulfillment of a precise number of key cognitive functions .. The influence of other external 
elements like, for instance, environment work shifts, will be considered later on .. 
Summarizing, the model proposed doesn't represent operators reliability itself, but reproduces the 
interaction process between man and system 
3. THE CASE STUDY 
The study was performed analyzing a chemical production plant, owned by a worldwide enterprise. In 
particular has been considered a part of the phtalic-anhydride production cycle [4l, putting the attention 
on the refrigeration system of the reactor. 
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Figura 1 : Phatlic - anhydride production cycle 
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The reactor, as shown in figure 1, is cooled by a salts circuit that is chilled, in its turn, by a water 
circuit, connected by an heat exchanger.. The present application regards the water circuit. It is 
composed by three process components: the electrical motor, the pump, the piping with the heat 
exchanger .. These elements are monitored by a control system whose aim is to avoid that a breakdown 
in the salts refrigerating system could cause a dangerous reactor temperature growth.. The main 
process variable is the temperature, its control and management is essential to obtain a chemical 
product with the required properties and to avoid dangerous events .. The presence of the operator, in 
parallel with the automatic control system, is requested considering the severity of the possible 
accidents .. 
Cooling process is monitored in a control panel room where diagnostic signal arrives. Each machine 
failure or system breakdown causes an automatic process stop by means of turning off the reactor .. If 
this automatic system fails for whatever reason, there is a standing by manual system which will stop 
the reaction .. Manual stopping action is composed by two steps: first step is in the control room where 
the operator should check the system failure and the second step is on the plant where another 
operator, activated by a phone call of the first one, should close the inlet reactor valve. Since operators 
belong to eight hours work shifts rotating during the 24 hours, we had to consider the presence of three 
different teams. Each team is composed by a control panel operator and a worker in field.The control 
system of the circuit has a sensor that control the fluid flow in the pipes. In the standard operative 
condition such an instrument checks the flow in the cool water circuit and acts on a regulation valve. 
Moreover, if for any reason there isn't flow in the pipes, it is able to stop the reaction process 
operating on the reactor inlet valve. We considered as an alarm a warning event that is not managed by 
the automatic control system and thus requires an action performed by a human being .. It happens 
when automatic control system fails and operators are called to operate.. The preliminary control 
system study was performed using an FTA [SJ shown in figure 2. 
Figure 2 : Fault tree analysis related to control system 
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The corresponding control system RBD [sJ, shown below, was built using the reliability data obtained 
fromFTA. 
Figure 3 : Control system RBD Figure 4 : Mechanical components RBD 
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In Figure 3 is shown the control system RBD .. The item called Sub3 represents the human interaction 
model, better explained in Figure 6. 
4. THE ASSESMENT METHODOLOGY 
Simulation is the methodology used to approach the study and the simulator software chosen is SP AR 
[6J (produced by ClockWork Group). SPAR is a maintenance process simulator characterized by a 
great flexibility and is able to: 
• Represent a very large number ofwork timetables; 
• Manage numeric values uncertainty; 
• Modify system logics during the simulation runs .. 
Moreover it is also possible to create some code lines to build up logie and model not available in the 
standard program tools .. 
The system implementation in the process simulator required the following steps: 
• · Reliability Block Diagram (RBD) construction; 
• Mechanical and electrical blocks definition by reliability values and data (MTBF, MTTR, 
maintenance policies man maintenance inspections); 
• Creation of management logics by some code lines with the Bubble Maker tool. 
Human factor influence is introduced by procedures that represent the sequence of operations that 
human operators have to do .. In every task it is possible to recognize cognitive activities and basic 
cognitive functions. Using SPAR we created an RBD in which we had to model cognitive functions as 
a serial or parallel set of block. Considering that human operators should complete all the cognitive 
functions requested from their tasks, the overall cognitive functions would be represented by a serial 
system. 
Figure 5 : Procedure and cognitive functions RBD 
It was necessary to attribute to each block a failure rate. In the case of cognitive functions we used a 
failure rate obtained using historical data from scientific literature and a numerica! index derived from 
the application of a cognitive model.. 
I 
Arcfz=n·iv"LAiz 
j=I 
(1) 
Where Ày01 is the theoretical cognitive function failure rate and it comes from the product of the 
following terms: 
• n is the cognitive function occurrence in a single procedure (Figure 6); 
• iv is the average procedure evaluation index for each cognitive function (Figure 6); 
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• Àj 2 are the nominal values of cognitive function failure modes [7l for each one of the z (four) 
cognitive functions. 
The numerica! index Civ) is obtained analyzing the procedure used by the operator through HTA-
Hierarchical Task Analysis [SJ. For each task identified it is possible to recognize the cognitive 
activities and the cognitive functions .. Evaluation index is assigned to each cognitive function using a 
methodology derived from the CREAM (Cognitive Reliability and Error Analysis Method) [7l in 
order to obtain a cognitive demand profile which represents the cognitive load that each operator 
should assure 
Figure 6 : Cognitive functions evaluation indexes and occurrence 
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Human reliability depends on the operator really present in the system in every work shift, so we had 
to consider also the real cognitive profile available and eventually possible gaps in comparison with 
the cognitive demand profile l9l 
Figure 7 : Demand and available cognitive profiles related to panel control operator 
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Figure 8 : Demand and available cognitive profiles related to operator in field 
OPERATOR 
0,60 ------l:::] 
-------- --
-- - - -
(),40 -- -
0,00----
o Observat1on 111 lnterpretation o Planning o Execlrt1on 
140 -
120 
~ 100 
1 080-'- -
ì 060 
8 040 
020-
000 
OPERATOR 
[][] 
El Observation Il lnterpretation o Aanning o Execution 
If cognitive available profile is lower than cognitive demand, the conesponding cognitive function 
failure rates are increased with the same proportion, called a .. 
Freq - Faval
2 a = z with z = 1 to 4 (cognitive functions) 2 Freq2 
À,Rcf z = À,Tcf z (1 + az) 
ARcf 
2 
is the real cognitive function failure rate 
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(2) 
(3) 
... 
5. THE SIMULATION RESULTS 
Results come from 1500 simulation runs and each history lasts 28680 hours, that is equal to an 
operating mission profile of three years for a continuative 24 hours cycle .. It was made a comparison 
between the two different configurations of the monitoring system: 
1. only automatic control (ACS - Automatic Control System); 
2.. parallel by automatic control and operators check (AMCS - Automatic and Manual Control 
System). 
In the following graphs the performance indexes, reported always on y axis, are respectively indicated 
by a dark blue line for first configuration and a light green line for the second one .. On the x axis there 
is the operating time .. In picture 9 the ACS and AMCS probabilities of correct working are plotted. As 
shown, the control system with the human element is signifièantly safer .. 
Figure 9 : ACS and AMCS probabilities of correct working 
The operating average probability increases from 0,89 to 0,98 with a last value of about 97% of the 
AMCS versus 81 % of the ACS. The control system, therefore, has increased its reliability 
performance of about the 10% thanks to the introduction of the human controllers .. The lower gradient 
of the AMCS reliability is bound to the human element whose performances are renewed in every 
work shift while the mechanical and electromechanical components are subjected to ware out 
processes .. Anyway the ACMS probability still decreases because the human elements is only one item 
inside a more complex system.. The cognitive model shows that in the 10% of the cases of required 
intervention there may be a operators' mistake within the cognitive functions .. Considering not only 
the control systems but the whole cooling system, the simulation results are shown in picture 1 O where 
the probability of an uncontrolled failure event are presented .. The light line is the ACS one and the 
dark is the AMCS.. As visible, the human element yields a significant increase of the overall 
probability ofbeing in an under-control status, wich goes from 97% to 99%. 
Figure 10 : The overall system probabilities of correct working 
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The simulation showed that during the three years of operation, the system fails about four times and 
that 98% of this events the control system is able to detect the breakdown and will stop the reaction. 
Without the human element the last percentage is of about 89%. This means that every 8 years 
relevant accident would happen instead of one every 40 years with the operator. 
6. THE CONCLUSIONS 
The simulation results show qualitatively how important was the human ,,control in the case study, 
reducing the dangerous situations. Moreover a numerica! evaluation of the increased probability of 
having the system under-control, gave a quantitative first approximation of how better the second 
situation is. Our proposal wasn't to give a numerica! estimate of the human reliability itself but to 
appreciate only the human behaviour within a few well defined operating procedures. 
This effort was made because we had a reliability evaluation of a electromechanical control system 
and we needed to foresee the usefulness of the introduction of the human beings .. The present might be 
a possible way to be follow whenever it was necessary to conduct a feasibility study related to the 
introduction ofhuman operators with contro! tasks. 
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